Playing the fool: negotiated resolution and the plunder of rio Doce basin

Abstract

The negotial resolution model was the option of companies and organs of the justice system to deal with the damages resulting from the Samarco / Vale / BHP Billiton disaster. Thus, on the macro level, via the Conduct Adjustment Term (TAC), agreements on agreements were negotiated, whose terms have been repeatedly breached by companies; and, at the micro level, the reparation of those affected was individualized, using the negotiated mediation technique, used in the Mediated Indemnity Program (PIM). In effect, the option for contractual or negotiated solutions was proposed and has allowed the privatization of disaster treatment and its business management (ROJAS; PEREIRA, 2017), under the baton of the Renova Foundation, which reduces the repair costs for the companies causing the damage. Although the alternative solution of conflicts, in this case, presents a varnish of legality, in practice, companies are not held accountable, which perpetuates the accumulation by plunder (HARVEY, 2005) in favor of mining companies also at the time of (not) repairing damage caused. In addition, the legal and economic discourse, which disqualifies the judicial process as slow and bureaucratic, has legitimized the plundering of the territories of the Doce River basin, due to the neglect of the rights of the affected population.